Aesthetics of Care

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Aesthetics of Care

Practice in Everyday Life

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Expression of Care in Social Aesthetics

This chapter explores how the notions of care, interdependency, and relationality underlie our interpersonal relationships. A fulfilling social engagement based upon care requires aesthetic manifestations. This can range from creating *an* experience in the Deweyan sense, expressing care through body aesthetics, to conveying care through the design, arrangement, and handling of environments and objects. Here, the ethical commitment to care cannot be separated from its tangible aesthetic embodiment, largely through nonverbal communication. Furthermore, a successful social interaction supported by care requires not only for the active agent to practice expressing care through aesthetic means, but also that the recipient of care to be able to discern the expression of care and to respond appropriately. Cultivating aesthetic sensibility is thus an indispensable dimension of care ethics.

1 From Objects to Persons

In our daily life, our social interactions are often mechanical and rule-governed as we play the role of a store clerk, customer, medical professional, patient, lawyer, client, teacher, student, employer, employee, and so forth. Of course, there is a good reason for not getting personally involved with the other person and keeping a proper

distance in our interaction. Not everyone I interact with is my friend or family, with whom my relationship is (or should be) motivated by care. Does this mean that aesthetics and care have no role to play in the bulk of our daily life as we interact with different people?

In Chapter 1, I discussed aesthetics in light of care ethics and vice versa. If we start from care ethics, we move from our interpersonal relationships to our interactions with objects of aesthetic experience. If we start from aesthetic experience, we realize what is typically involved in such an experience of objects also applies to interpersonal relationships. This latter move from "objects into persons" is articulated by Arnold Berleant.[1] Since the aesthetic field and aesthetic engagement, the core notions of his aesthetics, refer to the occurrence and nature of experience, there is no limit to what constitutes the arena of aesthetics. Thus, according to him, the same notion of the aesthetic field and engagement can characterize social interactions between and among people. Aesthetic factors are present in "environments of all sorts, including human situations and social relationships."[2] The same desiderata of aesthetic engagement with objects, namely the focused attention to the individual specificity, open-minded responsiveness, and active and imaginative engagement that is based upon collaboration and reciprocity, apply to successful social interactions that are premised upon, and promote, respect for the others for who they are, appropriate response to what they offer, and the spirit of collaboration and reciprocity.

> the aesthetic field describes the context of interacting perceptual forces, and aesthetic engagement may at times characterize the perceptual experience of a social process. When it is an integral part of social relations, aesthetic engagement transforms that process, turning relationships governed by a utilitarian standard that objectifies people into a perceptual context of interdependencies.[3]

Accordingly, the aesthetics of social interactions cannot but determine, and be determined by, the ethical mode of human relationship. In short, "ethical values lie at the heart of social aesthetics."[4]

Berleant refers to the medical arena as one of the areas of our experience, besides education, business, and workplace, that tends to be dominated by more mechanical and scripted role-playing.

These occasions that generally give rise to I-It relationships have the potential for I-You interactions by adopting the aesthetic engagement model.

> A professional who is aesthetically aware performs a function by actively pursuing a plan of treatment designed to take into account not only the standard protocols but the particular characteristics, needs, and perceptions of the person being treated. . . . When aesthetically engaged, the individual undergoing treatment becomes an active participant, a collaborator in the process, understanding and appreciating everything that is done and making every effort to promote the optimum conditions for successful treatment. In this situation, as in all instances of aesthetic engagement, a human exchange takes place on a perceptual level, with eye contact, shared feeling, and interest that is palpable.[5]

As we have seen in Chapter 1, there is an increasing recognition among medical professionals themselves that the conventional mode of practicing medicine, to regard and treat a patient as a bundle of symptoms, an It rather than a You, is inadequate and misguided. They would agree with Berleant that the relationship between a medical professional and a patient should be first and foremost a humane and fulfilling human relationship, despite, or in addition to, the role expected to be played by each party. Berleant's claim is that such relationship requires *aesthetic* engagement, which I have argued is characterized by care, not in the usual medical sense whereby the professional is expected to dispense care to the patient but in the sense of the ethical mode of negotiating with the world including people.

When both parties are fully engaged with each other, the social interaction itself takes on a certain aesthetic form. A successful conversation, for example, makes for an aesthetic experience. Following John Dewey and Donald Davidson, Kalle Puolakka characterizes a successful conversation as having an organically developing sequence with various rhythms, such as suspense, surprise, cohesion, culmination, and conclusion.[6] Such texture and form of the conversation are based upon mutual understanding of what the other understands, activation of imagination regarding

what form and direction the conversation may take (that is separate from conjuring a pictorial image related to the content, although I would suppose it is not excluded), and improvisation of how to respond to the other party's utterance. It becomes a collaborative and spontaneous venture, and the whole enterprise reminds one of jazz performances. There is no script or score but only a loose outline of what we talk about or play, and we build upon each other's contribution while maintaining a general structure and organization.

In this regard, Puolakka makes a useful distinction between making a conversation and having a conversation: "In *making* a conversation, we are not fully engaged in the situation and the conversation lacks a sense of direction, sometimes proceeding only with great effort. . . . In contrast, *having* a conversation involves an inner movement and accumulation of the conversation that Dewey finds typical in aesthetic experience."[7] The former can be characterized as going through the motions. In contrast, when an exchange builds up the conversation to its fulfillment, we have a very satisfying experience, *an* experience in the Deweyan sense. While it may appear to happen naturally, in a way such a conversation results from much effort on both sides who are willing to take a risk, open oneself up to vulnerability, and take a chance in hoping that the other is willing to engage. At the same time, a certain degree of spontaneity is needed, as a strenuous effort to create what is characterized by Jean-Paul Sartre as "a perfect moment" between Roquentin and Anny in *Nausea* compromises the possibility of its aesthetic appreciation as they are experiencing it. Whatever the nature of a particular relationship between the parties may be, perhaps friends or total strangers who happen to strike up a conversation, it is a microcosmic case of developing a care relationship. I must attend to the other person fully, open myself to whatever he offers, and actively engage in responding with an appropriate response that is worthy of his offer. The primary step is both parties' willingness to listen to the other with open-mindedness.

In this regard, it is noteworthy that one of today's foremost designers in Japan, Kenya Hara, advocates the importance of emptying one's mind:

> "Emptiness" (*utsu*) and "completely hollow" (*karappo*) are among the terms I pondered while trying to grasp the nature of

> communication. When people share their thoughts, they commonly listen to each other's opinions rather than throwing information at each other. In other words, successful communication depends on how well we listen, rather than how well we push our opinions on the person seated before us. People have therefore conceptualized communication techniques using term like "empty vessel" to try to understand each other better.[8]

It should also be noted that the aesthetically satisfying conversation is derived more from the form rather than the content. Whether a business transaction or sharing one's private life, the emphasis on the content makes conversation more of a means to an end. Georg Simmel claims that sociability is rather generated by "good form . . . since in sociability the concrete motives bound up with life-goals fall away, so must the pure form, the free-playing, interacting interdependence of individuals stand out so much the more strongly and operate with so much the greater effect."[9] In order to ensure what he calls "the democratic structure of all sociability," where there is an equal and reciprocal back and forth without one party unduly dominating the relationship, and to ensure the focus on form, Simmel suggests restraint on bringing in overly personal and individual-oriented content to the conversation.[10] The content of the conversation from the sociability point of view is relevant only as "a mere means to maintain the liveliness, the mutual understanding, the common consciousness of the group."

A similar observation is made by Andrew Sayer, who describes sociability as follows: "A sociable evening with friends can best be enjoyed not by worrying about how you are feeling or what you are getting out of it, but by letting go and melting into an 'imaginative unity with the affective life of others.'"[11] The conversation is experienced as satisfying and fulfilling when it is woven into an aesthetically appreciable tapestry through mutual collaboration, whatever the content may be. One could characterize such an experience as a kind of participatory art premised upon equal and caring engagement with each other.

It is important to emphasize that the aesthetics of conversation and interpersonal relationships does not necessarily guarantee like-minded agreement. Such harmony of content may enhance the aesthetic

experience. However, it is more challenging but also rewarding to engage in a dialogue with somebody who holds a differing view on political issues or assessment of art. If each party simply throws their view at each other, spinning their respective wheel without creating any traction, such disagreements do not result in meaningful communication and exchange of ideas, as warned by Hara. It ends up being a juxtaposition of two monologues. Other times, even if in the end the dialoguers agree to disagree, the conversation can be satisfying when there is a genuine back and forth, each party willing to be open to the other's view while taking the time to explain their own view. This underscores that the aesthetics of conversation has more regard for the nature or form of interaction than the content. At the same time, this aesthetic concern with form does not mean it lacks social significance. On the contrary, it suggests a model of civil discourse that is sustained by the participants' commitment to uphold a caring and respectful relationship with others that leads to a collaborative venture.

In this regard, consider Claire Bishop's criticism of art projects that Nicholas Bourriaud touts as representing relational aesthetics: Rirkrit Tiravanija and Liam Gillick. While their art offers a space in which the audience is free to engage in various actions and conversations with others, this invitation for seemingly democratic participation is compromised by the predisposition of the like-minded audience, art lovers, who already know how to play this artistic game, so to speak. Naturally a convivial and harmonious atmosphere is generated because there is an implicit agreement that they are participating in a collaborative art-making venture, and they will cooperate, rather than challenge or question the setup, meaning, and value of the whole enterprise. According to Bishop,

> the relations set up by relational aesthetics are not intrinsically democratic, as Bourriaud suggests, since they rest too comfortably within an ideal of subjectivity as whole and of community as immanent togetherness. There is debate and dialogue in a Tiravanija cooking piece, to be sure, but there is no inherent friction since the situation is what Bourriaud calls "microtopian": it produces a community whose members identify with each other, because they have something in common.[12]

Essentially, these examples of relational art are experienced by a kind of cliquish group of the members of the artworld, disenfranchising those who are outside of the artworld, such as street vendors, manual laborers, factory workers, illegal immigrants, refugees, and the like, whose experience of such art may be very different from those had by art lovers and afficionados. Relationality in this context is already predetermined rather than generated through participants' efforts. It is too easy, not hard-won.

In addition, James Thompson points out that Bourriaud's emphasis on relationality in those art projects eclipses the social significance of its outcome. He points out that Bouirraud's concern "to patiently restitch the relational fabric" and to "turn beholders into neighbours" is ultimately a concern with "the formal aspects of this trajectory than the potential that new relational practices have for announcing or creating a fairer world."[13] Thompson's critique stems from his acknowledgment that the relationality cultivated through artistic means has a potential to be developed into care relationship that provides the foundation for a just society in which the well-being of every member is intricately enmeshed and intertwined rather than each member exerting autonomy, freedom, and independence. He thus calls for the rethinking of the usual model of actors- and performance-focused theater performance that makes rehearsals, backstage helping hands, and the human relationship between and among people involved in the production invisible. Successful participatory, relational theater art projects embrace the whole process including the so-called practice and the interpersonal relationships generated through the process.

> The emerging connections between individuals coalescing in this process have an aesthetics—a shape, feel, sensation and affect. This does not exist within one particular person or object of the work, but appears in-between those involved, so that there is a sensory quality of the process and outcome that cannot be disaggregated from the collective effort.[14]

Art that is based upon care aesthetics, thus, is process- and relationship-oriented and the aesthetic value is found in "co-created moments" instead of a certain display or outcome: "*the show is not*

always the thing."[15] Participation in such art project affords a sense of caring, being cared for, mutual respect, and concern for each other, and helps to "cultivate the understanding that regard for others is central to making the world a better place."[16] It may appear that the same criticism lodged against the like-minded participants in Tiravanija's and Gillick's can apply to this kind of theater production. However, I think the difference is that the former presents an appearance of open invitation with an emphasis on spontaneity, while the latter is clear from the outset that all the participants are cognizant of their roles in creating this relational experience.

Thus, the aesthetics of conversation and relationality in art suggests that democratic discourse that is premised upon the equality of all the participants and respectful regard for each other does not encourage facile agreement among the participants. If anything, it encourages reasoned disagreements and exchange of different ideas. It is the form of and the attitude toward the exchange that matters, not necessarily a harmonious content. We can disagree without being disagreeable or disrespectful, and the experience can be aesthetically satisfying despite lack of agreement or consensus.

2 The Role of Body Aesthetics

Now, any kind of direct, face-to-face human interactions, conversations or otherwise, are always experienced perceptually, mediated by voice, facial expression, and body movement. As such, their aesthetic features play a crucial role in determining the nature of interactions. From the point of view of care ethics, it is not sufficient that a certain goal gets accomplished, such as carrying on a conversation, agreeing on a treatment plan, driving a friend to a store, cooking a meal for a sick neighbor. The manner in which these goals are accomplished is as important as, or sometimes more important than, achieving the goal. That is, body aesthetics plays a critical role in promoting care-driven human interactions.

The ethics of care requires that one's care be expressed through embodiment. The "same" action can be performed gently and kindly, indifferently, or spitefully. As mentioned in Chapter 1, Noddings points out, "I cannot claim to care for my relative if my caretaking is

perfunctory or grudging."[17] I also referred to Peter Goldie's observation on the same point, although he seems to consider this as a strictly ethical matter. Others make the role of aesthetics in our ethical life explicit. For example, citing Seneca, Nancy Sherman remarks that "we spoil kindness . . . if our reluctance is betrayed in inappropriate 'furrowed brows' and 'grudging words'" and concludes that "playing the role of the good person . . . has to do with socially sensitive behaviour—how we convey to others interest, empathy, respect, and thanks through the emotional expressions we wear on our faces (or exhibit through our body language and voices)."[18] Marcia Eaton also points out that "we have to pay attention to the tone with which something is said, as well as to the content, and to the relations between the speakers, or to meanings of other words spoken earlier or later."[19] When expressing virtues, according to David E. Cooper, it is not enough that one makes a charitable contribution or writes a morally uplifting book. It "must show up in an aesthetically charged way—in gestures . . . or demeanour, 'style' and presence—that draws others, sensitive to the 'energy' being radiated, to the person."[20] Consider the difference between the way in which the then president Donald Trump threw paper towels to the Puerto Rican victims of hurricane as if they were a football and another action whereby they were handed to the people gently and carefully. Despite accomplishing the mission of handing out paper towels, an action carried out in a rather indifferent and nonchalant manner, as if it were a game, seems to compromise, or even nullifies, the value of the action's end result. I believe we often experience in our everyday life that the aesthetics of an action can make or break its moral value.[21]

One may dismiss body aesthetics regarding social interactions as a matter of etiquette or manners, which is often criticized for being superficial, or worse, a means of stereotyping and exclusion. Gender stereotyping particularly has a powerful force in dictating people's behavior which leads to a criticism of a person who does not conform to the expected way of conducing herself.[22] We are also all-too-familiar with the way in which a "respectable" mode of behavior has been codified as a means of exclusion. Invariably those who are considered to act contrary to a respectable manner tend to be the society's oppressed groups based upon race, ethnicity, economic status, national origin, and sexual orientation. We certainly

need to be cognizant of this danger as we judge other people's actions. Sometimes, what may appear to me to be a callous or rude behavior may not be so because of the other person's different cultural upbringing or an unusual circumstance. This reinforces the need for adjusting our judgment of others rather than indiscriminately imposing a preconceived standard of respectable behavior, bringing us back to the open-mindedness required in care ethics and aesthetic experience. At the same time, like the possibility of failed care relationship and a failed aesthetic experience, my effort in bending over backward to cast a positive light on a seemingly rude behavior has its limit. Unfortunately, the world is full of attitudes and actions indicative of indifference, rudeness, and hostility expressed through the aesthetics of actions.

Thus, there is no denying that aesthetics has a significant role to play in facilitating successful social interactions. They require both moral and aesthetic sensibility and sensitivity. Ossi Naukkarinen points out that tactful behavior is neither rule-governed nor prepared in advance, because "it is always an art of acting in the here-and-now," and, as such, "tact and its ethics approach the debates in aesthetics. When viewed like this, both tact and aesthetics are essentially about the sensory, context-specific evaluation of things."[23] Marcia Eaton similarly points out that "both *aesthetic and moral* sensitivity are demanded in making judgments such as 'This situation calls for bold action' or 'This situation calls for subtlety.'"[24] Whether called tact, sensitivity, flexibility, nimbleness, or responsiveness, this attention to the specifics of the other individual and the situation, as it is with the aesthetic experience, is a necessary condition for a successful human interaction. So are the open responsiveness and active, imaginative, and creative engagement with the other person. Ultimately, Eaton points out that there is a "connection between being a person who has aesthetic experience and being a person who has sympathies and insights of a kind required for successful social interaction."[25]

In Chapter 1, I discussed how care ethics requires both the process/motivation and the actual act. My care for another person needs to be actualized in some form of action. No matter how much I insist that I care about my mother, if I never lift a finger to do anything for her even if I am able, my so-called care remains empty, invoking the common criticism, "talk is cheap." At the same time, my action needs

to be motivated by genuine caring. Simply performing an action in conformity with what care ethics requires does not make the action one of care. This is perhaps best illustrated by a polite, pleasant, and smiley demeanor of those who play the role dictated by what is expected of that role. Daniel Putman claims that "salespersons consistently act in a way characteristic of the virtue and deciphering how much a particular salesperson might genuinely care about a customer is difficult" and concludes: "We seem to have accepted that a certain amount of pseudo-caring is inevitable in business and politics but the distrust of these institutions may be indicative of the fact that we know such actions are only a form of mimicry done for ulterior reasons."[26] Perhaps what we can say is that, in this role-playing performance, we expect the salesperson to behave in a polite manner and we are jolted when such façade of politeness does not exist or, worse, when the behavior exudes rudeness or even hostility.

But the problem of performance is not limited to role-playing. Without any specific role to play, one can be putting on a performance of how one wants to be regarded by others. Buber thus distinguishes "being" and "seeming," or "what one really is" and "what one wishes to seem," that is, putting on a performance in order to give a favorable impression to the other.[27] Such a show amounts to a kind of lie, according to Buber: "The lie I mean does not take place in relation to particular facts but in relation to existence itself, and it attacks interhuman existence as such. There are times when a man, to satisfy some stale conceit, forfeits the great chance of a true happening between I and Thou."[28]

This concern with mere performance is also addressed in Confucianism, well known for its insistence on the importance of expressing virtues by observing decorum through body aesthetics. Eric Mullis points out that "Confucius often expressed concerns about individuals whose embodied aesthetic expressions were not rooted in internal psychological states," and their actions, no matter how they conform to the societal expectation of proper behavior, are regarded as "an empty ritual that has no ethical import because it is not motivated by morally appropriate sentiments and broader moral dispositions."[29] In terms of judging the moral worth of someone's action, there is no sure way of ascertaining whether his seemingly caring interaction with me is genuinely motivated by his caring attitude

or a mere show. However, this unknowability can be mitigated to a large extent if we consult our everyday experience. I believe that it is rather commonly experienced that, if I am familiar with other things about him, I can place his particular interaction with me within a holistic frame, or what Mullis calls his gestalt, that provides consistency and coherence across the span of time. This enables me to make a more informed judgment. If he consistently acts in a similar manner toward everyone around him, there is a good reason to believe that his seemingly caring attitude toward me is genuine, although of course there is no absolute guarantee. Or someone's seemingly indifferent or callous manner may not be an indication of lack of care, because he is generally rough and gruff, like one of my uncles. His seemingly uncaring interaction with me can be mitigated by everything else I know about him, including his generosity and affection toward me though not expressed in the normally expected way. On the other hand, if my interaction with a person happens for the first time or only once within a limited time frame, there is no telling what motivated his seemingly caring interaction. But if I develop my knowledge and understanding of him through a continuing relationship, I will be in a better position to gauge his action in the broader context of his way of relating to the world around him.

3 Practicing Body Aesthetics

My discussion so far has been concerned primarily with a spectator's judgment on the moral value of the other person's action expressed through body aesthetics. While this judgment-making is an important aspect of care ethics and aesthetics, the primary concern for both is the first-person account as an active agent participating in social interactions. Social aesthetics through bodily engagement brings to light that we are both capable of and responsible for creating an ethically grounded and aesthetically satisfying experience for all concerned. This active role we play in shaping the social landscape does not receive due attention by the spectator-oriented discourse that has dominated Western aesthetics. I mentioned in Chapter 1 that the so-called virtue theory of aesthetics still adheres to this spectator mode of judging the product of art-related acts. The

account of virtue-driven aesthetics I am developing here can be considered a virtue theory of aesthetics that truly redirects the focus of inquiry to the account "from the inside." Just as we can sharpen our sensibility for aesthetic experience as a spectator, we can also cultivate and practice aesthetically sensitive social engagement. The ethical way of being and living is not merely a matter of conceptual understanding and acting according to a rule or performing. It has to do with conducting our life in such a way that the caring attitude and its expression in actions become who we are, and this needs cultivation and practice.

This emphasis on cultivation and practice of ethical life through aesthetic means is prominent in Confucianism with its emphasis on bodily expression of virtues and the importance of practice and cultivation. Nicholas Gier points out that "bad manners are wrong not because they are immoral but because they lack *aesthetic* order: they are inelegant, coarse, or worse," and "Confucian *li* [the good] makes no distinction between manners and morality, so an *aesthetic* standard rules for all of its actions."[30] In particular, artistic training provides a model for cultivating embodiment of moral virtues. For Confucianism, artistic training is not meant primarily as sharpening one's skills and creativity. Though they are not irrelevant, training in the arts is a means of self-cultivation. Eric Mullis explains: "learning and practicing an art form entails intentionally cultivating, refining, and expressing an integrated system of habits: motor habits necessary for the performance of artistic actions . . . as well as habits of perception."[31] This provides a model for cultivating a virtuous self, as "the process of ethical self-cultivation also includes self-awareness, a commitment to continued education, and the intentional cultivation and refinement of habits associated with virtuous disposition." Body engagement in art-making, such as calligraphy, dance, and music, in particular, offers an effective model of embodied expression of one's habits and perception. Through repeated performance and practice, one internalizes artistic training and a virtuous mode of being, and in turn they flow naturally into outward bodily expression. Thus, despite a possibility of performing a virtuous action as an empty gesture or going through the motions, performance and practice are indispensable to cultivating an ethical way of being in the world and interacting with others.

The cultivation of moral virtues through bodily practice is also prominent in the Japanese aesthetic tradition. For example, the art of tea ceremony, a kind of participatory art established in the sixteenth century, consists of a host entertaining a guest by serving tea and snacks in a tea hut. Although highly prescribed and choreographed and requiring repeated practice, the slow and elegant body movements of the host making tea and the guest receiving and savoring the drink are a silent but eloquent expression of the care and respect for the other party. While this art takes place apart from everyday life, the participants are expected to carry the aesthetic experience thus gained over to their everyday life. Various body movements expressive of respect and care toward objects and people are supposed to become the participants' second nature and inform their daily activities, such as eating, receiving a gift, and interacting with people. Kristin Surak describes the expression of care, respect, and gratefulness involved in the tea ceremony as "vigilant consideration of others," while Eiko Ikegami observes that the aesthetics of tea ceremony promotes "silent aesthetic communion . . .through artistry of motion and gesture."[32] It provides a model of ethical life conducted with the vehicle of aesthetics.

A Japanese geisha, literally meaning a person accomplished in the arts, practices classical instrumental and vocal music, dance, and the art of entertaining guests. The arduous physical regimen of all these activities, according to a first-person account, is "as much a discipline of the self as the technical mastery of an art form" and "if art is life for a geisha, then her life must also become art."[33] Accordingly, "a geisha's professional ideal is to become so permeated with her art that everything she does is informed by it, down to the way she walks, sits, and speaks."

The point of citing the training for tea practitioners and the geisha, as well as the Confucian practice of the arts, is not to claim that they all become virtuous through their training and participation in the respective arts. Rather, they demonstrate the efficacy and importance of bodily training through which personhood and artistry are cultivated. You "become" a certain kind of person who would naturally display the artistry gained. Cultivation of an ethical mode of being in the world and interacting with people and objects within it similarly requires embodied practice. As Robert Carter reminds us,

"correct ethical action most often grows out of concrete, physical training, or repetition, and is best described as a cluster of attitudes about who one is in the world and how to properly and effectively interact with others. Ethics is not a theoretical, intellectual 'meta' search, but a way of walking (or being) in the world."[34] Particularly in the Japanese tradition, according to him, "ethics is primarily taught through the various arts, and is not learned as an abstract theory, or as a series of rules to remember," and by being taught through arts, he means practicing arts oneself rather than being an onlooker or spectator who appreciates them, the favored mode of aesthetics in the Western tradition.

The importance of the care relationship and body aesthetics in interpersonal interactions raises a question as to how much gets compromised or changed in technologically mediated interactions. Many aesthetic features present in a face-to-face interaction, such as the tone of voice, facial expression, gestures, and general comportment are either not available or presented differently in the electronically medicated communication. Furthermore, this mode of communication often encourages people to simply vocalize what they want to say without engaging in a true dialogue or conversation with other people, as in Twitter. I raised a similar question regarding what counts as a direct experience of the other person during the time of pandemic in Chapter 1. Although I will not explore it here, I think it is worthwhile to speculate on whether and how different modes of communication and interpersonal relationships unfold both with technological advancement and in a situation such as the pandemic and what the moral and aesthetic implications of those modes will be.

4 Expressing Care through Objects

So far, my discussion of social aesthetics concerned the direct personal interactions through conversation, body movement, facial expression, and the like. However, my interactions with others are not limited to such direct encounters. The expression of care (or lack thereof) can be mediated by the design, creation, placement, arrangement, or handling of the physical objects, that is, nonverbally

and nonbodily. This section explores this aspect of social aesthetics by examining a number of examples, many of which, though not all, are taken from contemporary everyday environment in Japan. As I mentioned in Introduction, it is not my intention to idealize the Japanese culture or claim its superiority. For my purpose here, they are helpful in exemplifying my point about expressing care through objects. This kind of expression seems to have appeared quite early in Japan, as indicated by the aesthetics of garden and the tea ceremony, dating back to the eleventh century and the sixteenth century, respectively. In my observation, the aesthetic sensibility formed by them still has a considerable impact on people's lives today outside of these specific art forms.

The ethos of expressing care and consideration for others through objects has a long lineage in Japanese culture. The earliest writing on this subject is found in the eleventh-century manual for garden-making, *Sakuteiki* (作庭記), which lays the foundation for subsequent garden design in Japan. In addition to the principle of "obeying the request" that stresses respecting the individual characteristics of materials used, such as rocks or trees, another cardinal principle is changing the axis, meaning avoiding symmetry. Reminding us of Alexander Pope's criticism of formal gardens that adhere to strict symmetry where "Grove nods at Grove, each Ally has a Brother, And half the Platform just reflects the other," the absence of a central axis recommended in *Sakuteiki* is meant to honor and enrich the owners' and visitors' experience of walking through the designed space.[35] By avoiding symmetrical design, the garden provides a continuous source of stimulation, such as meandering paths, partially hidden vistas, and "borrowing" a distant landscape as a part of the garden (*shakkei* 借景). This other-regarding attitude toward garden-making that is designed to delight the visitors is alive and well in contemporary Japan. It can be seen in their everyday environment, such as gently curved entrance pathways into buildings.[36]

In addition to the body aesthetics discussed in the last section, the Japanese tea ceremony provides this object-mediated expression of care in a concentrated manner. The host carefully chooses, prepares, and arranges tea implements and decorative items like a hanging scroll, an incense burner, and flowers in a vase, in order to provide the utmost comfort and delight for the guest. He takes into

consideration not only each guest's interests but also the season, the time of the day, and the weather. The extreme details attended by the host are quite stunning. They include clearing the snow only from the stepping-stones in the garden and sometimes leaving snow in the water basin for winterly aesthetic delight, the nonchalant and labor-unintensive look of the knot of the string tied to secure the lid onto the tea container, the geometrical proportion that directs where to place various implements without giving an impression that the placement was belabored (*kanewari* 曲尺割) while at times breaking such proportionality (*minesuri* 峯摺), and highlighting the changing pattern of drying water droplets as the wet kettle surface dries by being heated.[37] While there are basic rules that guide these considerations, the ultimate decisions are made by the host according to the specific occasion. Just as the care relationship is developed when the carer attends to the singularity of the cared-for in a specific situation, orchestrating various aspects of the tea ceremony also requires being attuned to the specific occasion, referred to as *ichigo ichie* (一期一会), one time one meeting. It requires utmost sensibility, flexibility, and improvisational skills. Robert Carter thus remarks that "true mastery in practice is, while encountering new situations, dealing with any difficulties which might arise with an ease and spontaneity which displays, at the same time, imperturbability."[38]

This expression of care is also embodied in the simple meal and snack served along with the tea. It is often remarked that Japanese food serving is like a visual art. Each morsel is arranged strategically to enhance its native aesthetic appeal, rather than everything mixed and heaped together. A serving vessel, whether a plate or a bowl, is chosen not only to highlight the food inside but also to reflect the season. A Japanese dish thus provides both gustatory and visual feast, delighting the guest. Of course, the degree of meticulous attention is most prominent at a fancy restaurant or in a tea ceremony, but I can speak from my personal experience of growing up in Japan that a similar attention is also given for home-cooked and -served meals.

We appreciate the manifestation of care expressed by the aesthetic delight offered by the objects outside of Japan and occasions prompted by art such as a garden and the tea ceremony. For example, passengers walking on the corridor of Seattle-Tacoma Airport are treated to an enjoyable experience of tracking

the whimsical images of the school of salmon inlaid onto the floor (Figures 1–4). Their winding direction is fun to track, from the fry to the emaciated old ones, sometimes swimming individually and sometimes gathering in a pool, sometimes transforming into recognizable decorative salmon figures of the Northeast first nations and tongue-in-cheek salmon traveling with a suitcase or

FIGURE 1 *Seattle-Tacoma Airport.*

FIGURE 2 *Seattle-Tacoma Airport.*



FIGURE 3 *Seattle-Tacoma Airport (note the middle salmon carrying a suitcase).*



FIGURE 4 *Seattle-Tacoma Airport.*

transformed into an airplane shape! These figures on the floor are not simply decorative; they break up the monotony of walking on an airport corridor, welcome the visitors with the local flavor as well as delightful fun. After a long tiring flight, the passengers feel properly greeted and cared for.

What is underfoot often escapes our attention. However, as in this airport corridor, sometimes we find not-so-hidden gems on the street pavement. One of the fun experiences of visiting different places for me has become finding various patterns on the manhole covers. This quintessentially utilitarian objects from our everyday surrounding can be a source of enjoyment as well as the enhancement of the sense of place. Japan has a project concerning manhole covers that is well known by now, in which each municipality features the objects and landscapes associated with the place (Figures 5 and 6).[39] But Japan by no means has a monopoly over such a project. From my travels within the United States, I was heartened to be greeted with the similar sense of place and the pride in cities such as Portland featuring a rose, Phoenix a phoenix, and Seattle a map of its waterfront (Figures 7 and 8).[40] Seattle in particular offers delightful greetings with a wavy pattern at every corner of its urban environs, such as the pavements, the bus stop shelters, and other street furniture. Such unified patterns are certainly pleasant to behold in themselves, but their effect goes beyond straightforward sensory pleasure by integrating the sense of pride in the city and a sign of welcoming greetings to the visitors, in short an expression of care for the city, residents, and visitors.

FIGURE 5 *Manhole cover featuring Osaka Castle (Osaka, Japan).*

FIGURE 6 *Manhole cover in Ueno Park noted for cherry blossoms (Tokyo, Japan).*

FIGURE 7 *Manhole cover (Phoenix, Arizona).*

FIGURE 8 *Manhole cover (Seattle).*

In contrast, let us consider the opposite case where the objects exhibit lack of care. A glaring example is the train station in Providence, Rhode Island, which I sometimes use to go to Boston or New York. It is an embarrassment. Its platform with bare concrete structure has few signs indicating where it is or which way is Boston or New York, let alone any welcoming greetings for the visitors or indication of the sense of place. It exudes thoughtlessness, indifference, and carelessness.

I mentioned in Chapter 2 that a successful care relationship is based upon reciprocity, not necessarily in terms of the receiver of care returning a similar favor but in terms of returning a sign of grateful acknowledgment. The train station is an example of the other party not offering care for the passengers and visitors. On the other hand, let us consider the case in which the other party is offering an aesthetic manifestation of care for us, but we are not reciprocating by not even acknowledging, let alone appreciating, the aesthetic gift offered. Suppose I hurry through a garden without paying attention to the thoughtful ways in which the rocks and trees are arranged, gobble up a beautifully arranged dish, and never notice the aesthetic presentation of a sense of place at every street corner and literally underfoot. It is not only that my aesthetic life is impoverished by remaining oblivious to the aesthetic bounty offered but most likely

my moral life is probably not as richly endowed as it could be. Even if I am the "recipient" of an aesthetic expression of care, the relationship will not be fulfilled if I lack the sensibility, perceptive power, and moral sensitivity to be able to discern, appreciate, and reciprocate by full engagement.

Commenting on Japanese food, Graham Parkes remarks that "the care with which the food has been prepared and presented invites corresponding care and attention in the handling and eating of it."[41] In a similar manner, a successful experience of tea ceremony makes demands not only on the host for setting it up and executing it but also on the guest who needs to attend carefully to various details that express the host's care. Today's tea master, Sen Genshitsu XV, thus explains that the primary purpose of the tea ceremony is a tacit communication, "contagion," whereby "the guests will 'feel' what the host intended to 'give' them in and through the ceremony. An intense level of kindness prevails, and the guests learn through this enveloping atmosphere to be kind to one another in turn."[42] As previously mentioned, the vehicle of this contagion is aesthetic: body movements, selection and arrangements of various objects, the singular atmosphere resulting from the integration of all the elements including those beyond human control, such as the season, time of the day, and weather. The aesthetic sensibility necessary to recognize and appreciate such aesthetic manifestation of care *is* a moral sensibility as well. As summarized by Carter, the tea ceremony "is an event of a 'Thou' interacting intimately with other 'Thous.'"[43] As such, it is an aesthetic activity that promotes cultivation of kindness and respect for others, and "learning to be kind is not just the intellectual recognition of what kindness is, but through mind and body as unified, one actually practices being kind."[44] Aesthetic experience, as discussed in Chapter 1, thus is not something we as recipients passively take in, but is generated by our active engagement requiring an ethically grounded and mindful entanglement with the world.

So far, the aesthetic gifts offered or denied by the examples have been fairly obvious. With respect to the tea ceremony, gardens, and food, we expect aesthetically charged experiences and are predisposed to gain an aesthetic pleasure. In cases of the objects underfoot, their decorative elements are added specifically for aesthetic delight. In both cases, the expression of care is forefronted

because there are a number of ways in which objects could have been created and handled differently, such as the tearoom prepared only according to what is most convenient for the host, the food served haphazardly on a plate, and the manhole covers featuring a generic geometrical pattern merely to prevent slippage. Hence, it will take an extremely dull sensibility not to notice and appreciate these gifts.

In comparison, the need for perceptual acuity and imaginative engagement become more pressing for the following examples, because their aesthetic expression of care tends to be invisible, either because we take them for granted or because they address special needs not shared by everyone. It is a common sight in Japan that a small shelf is placed below a counter at stores, banks, post offices, hotels, airports, and ATM machines, where one can put a pocketbook and other belongings while tending to the transactions (Figures 9 and 10). An even smaller shelf with a half circle cut out is often seen at the same places for resting a cane and an umbrella, while sometimes an umbrella stand is located at the entrance (Figures 11 and 12). The subway hanging straps are often of different lengths to accommodate people with differing heights (Figure 13). Public bathrooms are equipped with a baby seat attached to the wall where a baby can be placed while the parent tends to her needs (Figure 14). Some clothes

FIGURE 9 *Airline counter with tables (Shinchitose Airport, Japan).*

FIGURE 10 *Bank ATM machine with a table in front (Sapporo, Japan).*

FIGURE 11 *Post office table with a cane holder and umbrella stand (Sapporo, Japan).*

FIGURE 12 *In-store ATM machine with a cane and coffee cup holders (Sapporo, Japan).*

FIGURE 13 *Subway car (Sapporo, Japan).*

FIGURE 14 *Baby seat inside a public toilet (Haneda Airport, Tokyo).*

feature big buttons with diagonal buttonholes for easy maneuver for those who are dexterity-challenged, such as children, senior citizens, and people suffering from arthritis. Finally, a well-known children's tune or a bird's chirping is used to announce safe crossing of a street to the visually challenged.

None of these objects provide aesthetic delight the way the objects in the previous group of examples do. However, they provide care by addressing specific needs, sometimes of a certain group of people while other times of all of us when we find ourselves inconvenienced by situations like carrying too many things. From the aesthetic point of view, we may further distinguish those which provide care by their sheer existence regardless of the sensuous features, such as the baby seat, a shelf under the counter, and a cane holder, from those which provide care by their specific design, such as the buttonholes and the tune for safe street crossing. That is, the former responds to people's needs not so much by their specific design features because there cannot be that much variation for fulfilling their function; the important thing is that they are placed where they are. In comparison,

the safe crossing signal can be conveyed by different sounds such as a series of mechanical staccato sounds often heard in the cities in the United States and Europe. However, the sound of a bird chirping, or a familiar children's tune, creates a gentler and more pleasant soundscape compared to the harsh mechanical staccato sounds.[45]

In this regard, consider the final example originally from the United States but now available globally: OXO brand of kitchen utensils. Its vegetable peeler is a redesign of the basic metal peeler. It has an enlarged handle made with a nonslip polypropylene plastic and rubber material for easy grip that is further enhanced with flexible fins that can conform to individual grip, preventing the peeler from slipping. In addition, an oversized hole at the end of the handle makes it easy to hang, particularly for the visually impaired. It turns out that the designer of this redesign was inspired by watching his wife with severe arthritis struggle with a conventional metal peeler to peel a potato. Akiko Busch characterizes this peeler's "kind of funky elegance that made it appealing to everyone" as embodying "consideration, empathy, and comfort."[46]

But when we characterize an artifact as expressing or embodying care and consideration or indifference and neglect, what are we doing exactly? Are we making a judgment of the attitude or motivation of the designer? After all, an object cannot be held responsible for lack of care or credited for being considerate. Although we often do criticize an object or a built structure for being thoughtless or praise it for its care toward us, it is a shorthand way of making a judgment on the designer, according to this line of thinking. In the next section, I will argue for the legitimacy of attributing moral characters to an object.

5 Moral Agency of Objects

Let's consider again the example of the Providence train station. Nigel Taylor's criticism of those objects or structures that appear to be put together carelessly and shoddily without any consideration of its relationship to the surroundings is apropos here. Such structures, Taylor states, "would offend us aesthetically, but, more than that, part of our offense might be ethical. Thus we might reasonably be angered or outraged, not just by the look of the thing, but also by the

visual evidence that the person who designed it didn't show sufficient *care* about the aesthetic impact of his building."[47] He concludes that "to care . . . for how something looks, and thereby for the people who will look at it, is to exhibit not just an aesthetic but also a moral concern. Or rather, it is to exhibit an aesthetic attentiveness which is itself moral."

Taylor seems to suggest that there is an ethical demand on architects and designers to design their objects with care which should be manifested in the specific features. If we regard this object-regarding demand as a code of professional ethics, it is rather unique. Professional ethics regarding other disciplines, such as medicine, science, business, journalism, law, education, social work, and the like, primarily concerns what constitutes professional conduct, such as confidentiality, honesty, whistleblowing, conflict of interest, humane treatment of nonhuman animals, and relationships with clients, patients, or students. This reflects a widely accepted belief that ethics deals only with our interactions with members of moral community, typically other humans, but today with the establishment of environmental ethics nonhuman creatures, plants, inanimate objects of nature, and arguably nature in general. In this framework, artifacts are placed outside of the moral community.

When ethical considerations are directed toward objects, they often concern art or objects of some special historical or social significance. For example, as mentioned in Chapter 1, in art appreciation and criticism we debate about the aesthetic relevance of the moral character of the artist or performer, controversial subject matter, such as regarding race, religion, and political ideology, and the problematic process involved in the creation, such as harm to humans, animals, or environments. In addition, particularly in recent years, questions have been raised with increasing frequency about public monuments and memorials associated with problematic past. Finally, street art and graffiti are sometimes criticized as an act of vandalism. In these last examples, ethical considerations are derived from extraneous factors associated with the objects, not generated by their sensuous qualities. The problematic historical significance of a statue and the graffiti's perceived disrespect for public property are regarded as affecting their aesthetic value, if judged from a moralistic perspective, irrespective of their sensuous appearance.

In comparison, relatively absent is ethics regarding artifacts themselves. Warwick Fox, for example, observes that "Western ethics has . . . overwhelmingly focused on our obligations in respect of people."[48] While Fox recognizes the development of environmental ethics has ramifications for the artifactual world, he points out that environmental ethics' primary focus has been nature and "the built environment constituted the major blind spot in theorizing associated with the development of environmental ethics to date." Furthermore, he claims that it is not sufficient to address sustainability and carbon footprint in the ethics of built environment. It should include *aesthetic* considerations such as a structure not fitting in with its surroundings even when it is otherwise sound in virtue of satisfying human needs and minimizing its carbon footprint, and he develops his architectural ethics by virtue of what he terms "responsive cohesion."[49]

Ezio Manzini also points out that, in comparison with macro-level examination of grand programs such as energy systems and artificial intelligence, "we continue to lack . . . an ethics of design" of "the diffuse production of material and immaterial artifacts from which we build the daily environment."[50] The recent decision by the American Institute of Architects to censure those architects who knowingly design spaces intended for execution, torture, and solitary confinement is noteworthy in the sense that it takes a clear position against the ethics of the intended use of some built structures. Even then, this code of professional ethics addresses the intended function of what they design, regardless of the particular aesthetic features of the designed space.[51] In general, therefore, I agree with Fox and Manzini that ethics regarding artifacts' aesthetics has been largely absent in Western philosophy and design discourse.

When it comes to many everyday objects and structures whose designers and creators are largely unknown, let alone their intention or attitude in creating the object, the physical objects themselves often take on the moral attributes such as care, thoughtfulness, consideration, and kindness, or indifference, neglect, callousness, and hostility. Such judgments we make may be interpreted as an indirect judgment of the anonymous architects and designers. Taylor's previously cited criticism of a structure that seems to have been created without care applies both to the object itself and the designer behind it: "we might reasonably be angered or outraged, not just by the look of the thing,

but also by the visual evidence that the person who designed it didn't show sufficient *care* about the aesthetic impact of his building."[52] Although we often curse the unknown designer for creating such an object, it seems to me that the anger is also directed toward the object itself, because the fact is we as users are negatively affected by the sensuous features of the object. Unlike when we interpret and evaluate art by considering the artist's intention and her *oeuvre*, we normally judge an artifact on the basis of the object itself alone: the proof is in the pudding.[53] It may be the case that the apparent lack of care in the train station resulted from the designer's failed attempt or his lack of skills, rather than from his indifference. Or, conversely, the apparent evidence of care may not guarantee that such a stance was assumed by the designer. However, regardless of the intention or ability of the designer, the notion of care is often invoked when judging designed objects and structures in our everyday life.

Those who embrace the Western ontological framework may resist attributing moral qualities to objects. They lack sentience, free will, and the kind of agency we humans exercise, which makes them ineligible for being assigned a moral blame or praise. Criticizing an object for being disrespectful or praising another for being thoughtful seems to be a quintessential case of a category mistake. So, when Juhani Pallasmaa, himself an architect, characterizes the ethos defining much of contemporary architectural structures variously as "arrogance," "narcissism," "impudence," "ego trips," and "showiness," he must be referring to larger-than-life so-called starchitects.[54] When he instead calls for "an architecture of humility" based upon modesty, courtesy, responsiveness, and care, he must be calling for a character transformation of his fellow architects, so the objection goes.

It is easy to turn criticisms of starchitects' showcase pieces into a criticism of the architects' personality, but Pallasmaa's criticisms *are* referring to the structure's aesthetic features comprised of size, shape, spatial configuration, relationship with the surroundings, materials used, negotiability, comfort for the dwellers/visitors, and the like. We often make these judgments, even *despite* what we know about the architect. For example, I believe we will be hard-pressed to characterize Frank Lloyd Wright's prairie-style buildings as being arrogant and showy, despite his rather messy personal life and dictatorial personality.

The attribution of moral virtues or vices to artifacts is voiced not only by those who are involved in design profession. David E. Cooper, for example, advocates virtue-centric aesthetics: "Beauty will surely have significance for us if we see in it the exemplification and expression of the virtues we admire."[55] He illustrates this by taking Japanese gardens and French formal gardens like Versailles as an example. He argues that it makes sense to attribute virtues (or their opposite) to gardens insofar as the former exhibits or embodies virtues of being "'unpretentious,' 'graceful,' 'dignified,' 'free and open,' 'generous,'" and the latter "the artificiality, pretentiousness, vainglory, and the 'enslavement' of nature."[56] Some may not agree with these characterizations of these gardens, but his main point, which is also my point, still remains. That is, Cooper concludes that "I find it neither puzzling nor awkward to ascribe to buildings, say, qualities such as austerity, boldness, humility, friendliness, and generosity."[57] The moral virtues and vices are aesthetically relevant as features of the object insofar as the design features embody them. In locating virtues or vices in the qualities of the object, Cooper's virtue-centric view differs from the virtue theory of aesthetics which locates them in the creator behind the objects.

There has been an increasing attention to the possibility of attributing agency to artifacts, particularly in the field of technology studies. According to those who argue for the agency of objects, they *shape* our actions. For example, while agreeing that artifacts lack intentions, claims, and responsibility, Peter-Paul Verbeek points out that artifacts often play a role in shaping or mediating the users' actions, regardless of whether the designers explicitly designed the object to guide the users' actions that have moral significance. This leads him to claim that "moral community can also be defined in terms of the ability to *shape* morality."[58] Designed objects' agency is found in their "mediating role—one with an ethical dimension in that moral considerations are transformed, shaped, or even taken over." For example, the shape of a table determines the relationship between and among the people around it. A round shape enhances nonhierarchical equality, while a rectangular shape promotes more hierarchical relationship with someone "at the head of the table," and each seating arrangement carries a certain moral significance.[59]

There are other examples offered by thinkers from various fields that demonstrate how an object's design shapes or guides people's

action, sometimes for paternalistic reasons: speed bumps, an inwardly curved fence along the bridge and overpass to prevent suicide and throwing things, and a black image of a fly at the strategic point on the urinal to prevent spillage at Schiphol Airport in Amsterdam. Variously characterized as "actant," "commendable closure," and "libertarian paternalism," these objects "nudge" people toward or away from certain actions without closing off the possibility of engaging in different actions like not slowing down when driving over a speed bump, scaling the fence to jump, or aiming at a different part of the urinal.[60]

While these paternalistic design strategies may be innocuous enough, particularly because they do not fully determine our actions, thus not depriving us of the freedom to act otherwise, there are other examples of artifactual design that shape our actions completely through measures of exclusion. One of the most egregious historical examples of exclusionary design is the New York's Long Island parkways' overpasses built early twentieth century. They were designed too low to allow busses used by beachgoers who are mostly from the racial minority and economically disadvantaged population. Although the overpasses themselves do not possess an intention and irrespective of whether Robert Moses specifically commissioned a racist agenda, the overpasses act as a de facto agency for exclusion.[61]

A more contemporary and increasingly common example is urban furniture in many cities around the world that are specifically designed to deter what many societies consider to be undesirable actions. Such urban furniture invariably targets marginalized population, namely unhoused (commonly known as homeless) people and skateboarders who are, at least initially, predominantly urban youths from depressed neighborhoods. Variously characterized as "hostile architecture," "defensive architecture," "callous objects," or "obstinate objects," they include "anti-sleep benches" with armrest partitions or curvy shapes (Figures 15 and 16), "anti-homeless spikes" in front of store windows to prevent people from seeking refuge from inclement weather and loitering, "antipick garbage cans" that prevent people from fishing out food debris and recyclable items, and "skatestoppers" on a low wall with small metal nubs, sometimes called "pig ears," placed on the ledge (Figures 17 and 18).[62]



FIGURE 15 *Outdoor seating (downtown Providence, Rhode Island, USA).*

FIGURE 16 *Outdoor bench (New York City).*

FIGURE 17 *Bench outside a hotel (Phoenix, Arizona).*

FIGURE 18 *Outdoor seating (downtown Boston).*

Although sharp spikes may signal their function to everyone loud and clear, anti-sleep benches, antipick garbage cans, and skatestoppers are innocuous enough not to be noticed at all by those who use benches, garbage cans, and walls only for their intended primary functions of sitting and disposing of garbage. The benches' armrest, curvy shape, locked lid for garbage cans, and pig ears thus remain invisible to them. Robert Rosenberger describes a typical commuter's perception of these objects as "a phenomenology of political occlusion":

> Imagine that the commuter . . . is not herself living unhoused and rarely, if ever, thinks about things like trash picking, sleeping on benches, or navigating antiloitering ordinances. Despite using this bus stop every day, it is possible that this person will at most times be barely—if at all—aware of the antihomeless agenda built into this setting. . . . The utter normalcy of the experience itself keeps the politics occluded from view.[63]

These examples may pose extreme cases fraught with problematic moral, social, and political significance, but if we attend to our everyday environment with a critical eye, we may realize that many of its parts are designed to suit the dominant segment of the society, usually consisting of the economically advantaged, able-bodied, regularly sized, relatively unencumbered, cis-gendered, and literate. These assumptions regarding targeted users render negotiating public space challenging for the unhoused, the physically challenged, short or obese people, those carrying babies (in particular more than one)[64] or many large and heavy packages (typically those without cars who need to do grocery shopping using public transportation), transgendered, and those who are not proficient in the local language. Or, conversely, those objects mentioned in the last section, such as a cane holder and the different lengths of the subway hanging straps, that address some of these people's needs remain unnoticed by those without special needs. What can pose challenges and obstacles to some segments of society, as well as their solutions, remain invisible to the dominant group. Rosenberger points out that

> part of what may prevent us from seeing the politics built into the world around us is the basic fact that we are each limited by our own personal history of experience. . . . [W]hat each person knows is limited by the fact that she is an individual body in the world with a particular vantage point and a particular restricted set of life experiences.[65]

This brings us back to the main tenet of care ethics and aesthetic experience discussed in Chapter 1: the importance of experiencing the other, whether a person or an object, on its own terms through unselfing and decentering while activating the imagination.

While these examples of hostile architecture or callous object are clearly meant for an exclusionary purpose, there are others that are not intended but act as a de facto means of exclusion or oppression. Calling them "oppressive things," Shen-yi Liao and Bryce Huebner argue that artifacts can be racist, with or without the creator's intention. An example like the Kodak's Shirley card, which was "the standard tool used by professional photographers to calibrate skin-color balance during the printing process," constitutes "light-skin bias."[66] Designed to take light-skin color as the norm, thereby skewing the resultant colors of dark skin, they show how such objects help normalize whiteness while nonwhiteness as deviation. Racism is not just an idea or attitude held by people. It can be enacted by objects; hence the notion of "racist objects" which they define as follows:

> racist things are material artifacts and spatial environments that partially constitute the stability and structure of this racial frame, while also shaping the habits of attention and categorization and the attitudes that are typically adopted by people who live and act within this racial frame.[67]

Unlike in the case of defensive architecture, the examples of oppressive things are even more insidious and below the radar of most people because of the absence of explicit racist intention. It is a difference between Robert Moses having a racist intention in the construction of the parkways and the case in which the intention is to exclude large vehicles like busses and trucks from being on the parkways to create a more relaxing and leisurely atmosphere befitting

the name, parkway, without giving a thought that most passengers on the busses are black people.

The point of gathering these examples is to show that artifacts can be considered to exert agency by shaping human actions, often with moral consequences, even though they cannot be held responsible, and their agency is thereby different from the agency attributed to human beings. If agency in the sense explained can be attributed to artifacts, it is not far-fetched to endow them with moral qualities and evaluate them accordingly. Given the fact that artifacts are designed and created by humans, their expression of moral qualities can be considered as belonging to the realm of social aesthetics. Just as the aesthetic dimensions of my action helps determine its moral quality, the aesthetics of artifacts can be morally charged.

We should note that for the view that artifacts can be assigned agency because they shape human actions, thereby making sense of the moral attributes given to them, it is critical to keep in mind the fact that artifacts are designed and created by human intentional acts. Natural objects also shape our actions. For example, a steep mountain makes us walk around it to reach the other side, an apple tree invites us to pick its fruits, and the rain forces us to cancel an outdoor event. But we don't normally attribute moral qualities such as thoughtlessness or generosity to nature.[68] With the framework surrounding the view I have been discussing, the difference is due to the fact that nature works for or against us independently of us, while the way in which artifacts shape our actions could have been otherwise, either through a different design or by not creating the object in the first place. However, this distinction between artifacts and nature may be endemic to the Western philosophical framework. In other cultural traditions, such as some of the indigenous American traditions, it is not strange at all to assign generosity to a natural phenomenon or an object by thanking the rain for watering crops or a buffalo for giving up its life to feed its human siblings. I will explore this issue more in Section 1 of the next chapter.

When reviewing the examples used to illustrate the agency of artifacts, we note that they tend toward directing us *not* to do or *stop* doing certain things: sleeping on the bench, skateboarding, taking the bus to the beach, speeding when driving, spilling when urinating, and rummaging through garbage bins. Perhaps it is the most effective

way of illustrating the agency of artifacts because the result is fairly clear. One cannot sleep on the anti-sleep benches, skateboard on skatestoppers, or drive fast over a speed bump (I suppose one can but with a big price to pay for the damage to the car, not to mention an unpleasant jolt).[69] The design of these objects is *reactive* in the sense that they are addressing what is perceived to be a problem that needs to be corrected.

What deserves more attention, I believe, is the way in which artifacts are characterized as exercising agency in *proactively* exhibiting care for others, illustrated by many Japanese practices and the design of things underfoot that I mentioned before. If some artifacts are considered to exercise moral agency by shaping our behavior, as Verbeek suggests, it should include not only those that change our behavior that is deemed undesirable for the society at large and our own well-being but also those which facilitate and enhance the good for the society and our well-being. Guiding us to stop risky behavior such as speeding on the street can be considered a sign of care for our safety. However, care can be expressed in a more positive way by facilitating a delightful aesthetic experience, such as the meandering path in the Japanese garden, the salmon decorations on the airport floor, the meticulous arrangement of food, and the like, as well as easing the minor nuisances and inconveniences of daily life like not having a place to rest a cane or buttons that are too small to handle.

Care ethics and aesthetics help encourage proactive measures to promote not only social relationships and actions based upon care but also the creation of objects and built environment that give outward expression to the fact that care is given to every member, particularly the vulnerable, of the society. A humane and civilized society requires building the living environment for its members that provides tangible signs that the quality of their experience is taken seriously and responded to. Artifacts such as the OXO peeler, Busch states, "are instruments not simply of food preparation, but of human behavior, coordinates that can help us calibrate our place in human relations," and they "can be the small agents of *human decency*."[70] If I am surrounded by such small agents of human decency indicative of the care given to my needs, comfort, and well-being, I become disposed to pay it forward by spreading the gift of care. Unlike the care relationship between two people which requires reciprocity in some

form, when care is mediated by artifacts with unknown designers or creators, I cannot reciprocate in the same sense. Even when I know the designer or creator of the object, it seems beside the point to convey my appreciation to that person, although such a gesture may be welcome. Rather, when I am favorably affected by the expression of care in my everyday objects and environments, I believe my sensibility, both aesthetic and moral, becomes sharpened so that I become more sensitive to other people's well-being and needs and act accordingly. For example, by noting the different lengths of hanging straps in a subway, I become more attuned to how people of different statures are faring in a crowded subway. If someone with a short stature is struggling to keep balance, I may try to yield my space to her so that she can hang on to a longer hanging strap or a nearby pole.

Or, as Joan Nassauer, a landscape architect, states, visible evidence of care elicits an aesthetic response that is "potent in affecting behaviour. Sometimes the look of a well-cared-for landscape makes us feel good, and we may act to get or to share that good feeling, an aesthetic response."[71] Such a landscape gives a cue that it is worth maintaining and caring. This recognition will inspire me not to damage it, at the minimum, but furthermore to turn me into a literal caretaker by helping with tending the landscape. No matter how ecologically sound a landscape may be, if it appears to be neglected and unkempt, it is difficult to inspire a caring response from the onlooker. Thus, she argues for some recognizable cues of care, such as a neat border or a well-maintained fence, even if the garden itself consists of wildflowers growing freely and profusely, which is more ecologically sound compared to the monoculture of green lawn that is dependent upon heavy use of water and chemicals for its maintenance.[72] The "visible evidence of care and stewardship often elicits a response that is not only normative . . . but also aesthetic," and, as an immediate response, "it may be even more potent in affecting behavior."[73]

While the fact that recognition and appreciation of the signs of care inspire care and stewardship in the onlooker may be globalized, Nassauer points out that what are considered signs of care are culturally contextual and locally based. Hence, as in any aesthetic experience, it is critical that our aesthetic response to the sign of care is focused on the particularity of the constructed landscape

with its specific local conditions and cultural context. She suggests: "Care may be a global construct of aesthetic quality that is exhibited in different forms in different local conditions. If so, identifying forms of care and introducing new forms of care may be a useful tool for landscape ecology and sustainable development."[74]

The social relationship supported by care that I explored in this chapter is on an individual, personal level. It may appear that such micro-level matters pale in comparison to macro-level considerations such as the societal care for its members and the humanity's care for the global environment. Such pressing social, political, and environmental issues certainly need a macro-scale exploration from various perspectives: politics, law, sociology, anthropology, psychology, science, agriculture, and environmental management, to name some obvious ones. However, insofar as aesthetics can play a role in expressing and inspiring care for the other, whether it be another human being, object, or environment, the nature of aesthetic experience that requires direct experience of the singularity of the other necessitates focusing on the micro-level. However, Nassauer is optimistic that "bringing the immediacy of aesthetic satisfaction and neighborhood concern to a planetary community of care may be within our reach" because "our propensity to care for small places and familiar people may extend and aggregate across and beyond landscapes."[75]

This optimism regarding how appreciation of care and active participation on the micro-level can extend to the macro-level is shared by those who are engaged in participatory art projects that embody care acts and relationships. For example, by analyzing case studies of theater projects that are constituted by people's participation based upon developing and engaging in care relationships and acts with each other, James Thompson states: "Intimate care . . . can be connected to an affective solidarity and felt sense of justice, and ultimately might be foundational to the ethics and aesthetics of a theatre and arts practice that seeks to engage with communities."[76] As a theater experience which is public, the presumably private realm of care that is usually invisible, unnoticed, and taken for granted is given an explicit expression, blurring the so-called distinction between the private and the public. Furthermore, as a theatrical event, the aesthetic dimensions involved in reciprocal relationships, a

collaborative venture, and interpersonal interdependencies are made visible, such as the orientation and movements of participants' bodies in relationship with the others, not to mention their facial expression and the tone of voice. The embodied care relationship experienced from within, so to speak, as participants rather than spectators, it is expected, will lead them to be attuned to the communal ethos based upon respect and care for one another. Such a feeling forms the foundation of a just society where everyone's voice is respected and heard, interdependent and collaborative relationship is encouraged rather than regarded as weakness that compromises individual autonomy and independence, and empathetic responsiveness to one another is promoted and practiced. According to Thompson, "felt, embodied, careful collaborative acts of mutual reliance are the minute building blocks of that more caring, just society," and "an aesthetics of care can be a demonstration, a showing of caring, but . . . it can be the actual moment of building a more just distribution of caring and increase participants' capacity to care and be cared for."[77]

Insofar as care-driven ethical actions requires aesthetic engagement, which in turn requires direct perceptual experience, the focus should be on the micro-level: a personal relationship with the other. Just as care ethics practiced by an individual cannot extend to universal care for all the starving people, individuals' care for the environment cannot be directed on the global scale. Those large-scale issues must be addressed by political discourse that by necessity depends upon a generalized approach. However, this is not to diminish the significance of our personal engagement with the other that is driven by care and mediated by aesthetics. Just like Nassauer, I believe that the cumulative effect of our individual care activities helps shape the world. Similarly, as James Thompson claims in relation to theater arts that involve all the participants in developing embodied care relationship with each other, such small-scale movements "suggest something grander as potential sources for gentler, kinder forms of inter-human relations" and "hints of a more hopeful, equitable way of being together."[78] In short, the aesthetics of care provides an effective means of cultivating the ethics of care that can promote a just society and a sustainable world.

* * *

This chapter was devoted to exploring various aspects of interhuman care relationships, whether through direct interactions or mediated by objects. Objects in this context were regarded as a vehicle for expressing care for other humans. But what about our interactions with objects themselves for what they are? In the next chapter, I shall explore the ways in which we individually interact with the material world motivated by care.

Chapter 3

1 Berleant, "Objects into Persons," 9–18.

2 Berleant, *Living in the Landscape*, 39.

3 Berleant, "Objects into Persons," 12.

4 Berleant, *Sensibility and Sense*, 95.

5 Berleant, "Objects into Persons," 14.

6 Puolakka, "The Aesthetics of Conversation."

7 Ibid., Sec. 2.

8 Kenya Hara, *White*, trans. Jooyeon Rhee (Baden: Lars Müller Publishers, 2010), Prologue. Hara's discussion of emptiness is also found in *Mujirushi Ryōhin no Dezain* (*Mujirushi Ryōhin's Design*) (Tokyo: Nikkei BP sha, 2015), 50, 67–9, and the chapter on "Simple and Empty—Genealogy of Aesthetic Sensibility," in *Nihon no Dezain—Biishiki ga Tsukuru Mirai* (*Japanese Design—Future Created by Aesthetic Sensibility*) (Tokyo: Iwanami Shoten, 2012).

9 Georg Simmel, *Simmel on Culture*, ed. and trans. David Frisby and Mike Featherstone (London: SAGE Publications, 2000), 121.

10 Ibid., this passage from 124 and the next passage from 127.

11 Sayer, *Why Things Matter to People*, 124.

12 Bishop, "Antagonism and Relational Aesthetics," 67.

13 James Thompson, "Towards an Aesthetics of Care," in *Performing Care: New Perspectives on Socially Engaged Performance*, ed. Amanda Stuart Fisher and James Thompson (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2020), 43.

14 Ibid., 45.

15 Ibid., 46, emphasis in the original.

16 Ibid., 47.

17 Noddings, *Caring*, 9.

18 Nancy Sherman, "Of Manners and Morals," *British Journal of Educational Studies* 53, no. 3 (2005): 285.

19 Eaton, *Merits, Aesthetic and Ethical*, 92.

20 David E. Cooper, "Buddhism, Beauty and Virtue," in *Artistic Visions and the Promise of Beauty*, ed. Kathleen M. Higgins, et al. (Cham: Springer International Publishing, 2017), 132.

21 The issue may be a bit more complicated and nuanced than the way I presented. This body movement of throwing paper towels should be further put into context of the thrower's overall character. The "same" movement performed by Trump and, say, Obama may be interpreted differently if we consider the whole "gestalt" of each person. See the following discussion on the gestalt of a person.

22 Sometimes it is codified in the language use, as in Japanese informal speech, that distinguishes words and expressions expected to be used by males and those by females. The recent remark by the then head of the 2020 Tokyo Olympic Games Organizing Committee, Yoshirō Mori, that is critical of female members' participation taking up too much time in meetings implies that modesty and reticence are virtues expected of female members. Needless to say, his remark was met by a flurry of criticisms of gender stereotyping and expectation, forcing him to resign from his post. In addition to linguistic expectations, there is also different body movements and composures that are gender specific in Japan, such as sitting on a floor cross-legged being allowed for males but not for (respectable) females. For a discussion of "oppressive aesthetic demands" that disproportionately affect women, see Alfred Archer and Lauren Ware's "Beyond the Call of Beauty: Everyday Aesthetic Demands Under Patriarchy," *Monist* 101 (2018): 114–27.

23 Ossi Naukkarinen, "Everyday Aesthetic Practices, Ethics and Tact," *Aisthesis* 7, no. 1 (2014): 32 and 31.

24 Eaton, *Merits, Aesthetic and Ethical*, 92, emphasis added.

25 Marcia Muelder Eaton, *Aesthetics and the Good Life* (Rutherford: Fairleigh Dickinson University Press, 1989), 175.

26 Putman, "Relational Ethics and Virtue Theory," 235.

27 Buber, "Elements of the Interhuman," 107, for this and the next passages.

28 The concern here reminds us of the virtue theory of aesthetic cited in Chapter 1. As I indicated, its focus is the creation and activity of art, but the same consideration of requiring virtuous motive can apply to our action here.

29 Eric Mullis, "Thinking through an Embodied Confucian Aesthetics of Persons," in *Artistic Visions and the Promise of Beauty*, ed. Kathleen M. Higgins, et al. (Cham: Springer International Publishing, 2017), 144.

30 Nicholas F. Gier, "The Dancing *Ru*: A Confucian Aesthetics of Virtue," *Philosophy East & West* 51, no. 2 (2001): 288, emphasis added.

31 Mullis, "Thinking," 142 for this passage and 143 for the next passage.

32 Kristin Surak, *Making Tea, Making Japan: Cultural Nationalism in Practice* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2013), 52; Eiko Ikegami, *Bonds of Civility: Aesthetic Networks and the Political Origins of Japanese Culture* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005), 227.

33 Liza Crihfield Dalby, "The Art of the Geisha," *Natural History* 92, no. 2 (1983): 51, for this and the next passages.

34 Carter, *The Japanese Arts and Self-Discipline*, 5 for this passage and 2 for the next passage.

35 Alexander Pope, "An Epistle to Lord Burlington," in *The Genius of the Pace: The English Landscape Garden 1620–1820*, ed. John Dixon Hunt and Peter Willis (Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press, 1990), 213. This avoidance of symmetrical design also reminds one of William Hogarth's notion of a serpentine line as the line of beauty.

36 For visual images of Japanese gardens and contemporary streetscapes, see 152–63 and 172–7 of my *Aesthetics of the Familiar: Everyday Life and World-Making* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2017).

37 These items are culled from the sixteenth-century tea master Sen no Rikyū's teachings recorded by his disciple, Nanbō Sōkei, in *Nanbōroku* (*Record of Nanbō*). *Nanbōroku o Yomu* (*Reading Nanbōroku*), ed. Isao Kumakura (Kyoto: Tankōsha, 1989).

38 Carter, *The Japanese Arts and Self-Discipline*, 93.

39 For many other examples, see http://462photoblog.net/?page_id=19, accessed March 10, 2021.

40 Because of my interest in manhole covers, over the years my friends and colleagues have sent me what they found in their everyday landscape as well as during their travel, including Serbia

and Denmark. I thank Peter Cheyne, Susan Feagin, Carolyn Korsmeyer, and Russ Quacchia for adding to my collection!

41 Graham Parkes, "Savoring Taste," in *New Essays in Japanese Aesthetics*, ed. A. Minh Nguyen (Lanham: Lexington Books, 2018), 111.

42 Carter, *The Japanese Arts and Self-Discipline*, 90.

43 Ibid., 86.

44 Ibid., 90.

45 I thank one of the participants in the graduate seminar at Uppsala University who asked a question regarding this example by criticizing the annoyingly harsh sound apparently common in Sweden.

46 Akiko Busch, *The Uncommon Life of Common Objects: Essays on Design and the Everyday* (New York: Metropolis Books, 2004), 84.

47 Nigel Taylor, "Ethical Arguments about the Aesthetics of Architecture," in *Ethics and the Built Environment*, ed. Warwick Fox (London: Routledge, 2000), 201–2. The next passage is from 205.

48 Warwick Fox, "Architecture Ethics," in *A Companion to the Philosophy of Technology*, ed. Jan Kyrre Berg Olsen, et al. (Chichester: Wiley-Blackwell, 2009), this and the next passage from 388.

49 Warwick Fox, *A Theory of General Ethics: Human Relationships, Nature, and the Built Environment* (Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press, 2006).

50 Ezio Manzini, "Prometheus of the Everyday: The Ecology of the Artificial and the Designer's Responsibility," in *Discovering Design: Explorations in Design Studies*, ed. Richard Buchanan and Victor Margolin (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1995), 220, 219.

51 Julia Jacobs, "Prominent Architects Group Prohibits Design of Death Chambers," *The New York Times*, December 11, 2020.https://www.nytimes.com/2020/12/11/arts/design/american-institute-of-architects-execution.html?campaign_id=2&emc=edit_th_20201213&instance_id=24999&nl=todaysheadlines&regi_id=40614031&segment_id=46781&user_id=67fb6c4431a7ea59156285c346a5aac9, accessed December 13, 2020. These kinds of objects pose a challenge to whether we can even make sense of functional beauty in terms of the specific design serving the intended function well, as I discussed in Chapter 2, Section 3. Here my point regards the ethical responsibility for architects not to support an inhumane treatment of humans, rather than the relevance of such an unethical end to the object's aesthetic value.

52 Taylor, "Ethical Arguments," 201–2.

53 However, I pointed out in Chapter 1 that we don't really have access to the presence or absence of a virtuous attitude and motivation behind the artist's creative act.

54 Juhani Pallasmaa, "Toward an Architecture of Humility," *Harvard Design Magazine* (1999): 22–5. The terms cited occur throughout this article.

55 David E. Cooper, "Human Landscapes, Virtue, and Beauty," presented at a conference on *Ethics and Aesthetics of Architecture and the Environment*, Newcastle University, July 11–13, 2012, retrieved from academia.edu. p. 3.

56 Ibid.

57 David E. Cooper, "Beautiful People, Beautiful Things," *British Journal of Aesthetics* 48, no. 3 (2008): 258.

58 Peter-Paul Verbeek, *What Things Do: Philosophical Reflections on Technology, Agency, and Design* (University Park: Pennsylvania State University Press, 2005), 215 for this passage and 216 for the next passage.

59 Ibid., 207–8.

60 The example of speed bumps and the notion of actant are from Bruno Latour, "Where Are the Missing Masses? The Sociology of a Few Mundane Artifacts," in *Shaping Technology/Building Society: Studies in Sociotechnical Change*, ed. Wiebe E. Bijker and John Law (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1992): 225–58. The example of the fence and the notion of commendable closure are from Robert Rosenberger, *Callous Objects: Designs against the Homeless* (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 2017) and "On Hostile Design: Theoretical and Empirical Prospects," *Urban Studies* 1, no. 11 (2019): 1–11. The example of the urinal and the notion of libertarian paternalism is from Richard H. Thayer and Cass R. Sunstein, *Nudge: Improving Decisions about Health, Wealth, and Happiness* (New York: Penguin Books, 2008).

61 See Langdon Winner's discussion in *The Whale and the Reactor: A Search for Limits in an Age of High Technology* (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1989), 22–4.

62 I cite these terms from Robert Rosenberger's works referenced in note 60. He prefers the term "unhoused" to "homeless" because of the common negative connotation associated with the latter. See p. 2 of his *Callous Objects*. The term "obstinate objects" is used by Roman Mars and Kurt Kohlstedt in *The 99% Invisible City: A Field Guide to the Hidden World of Everyday Design* (Boston: Houghton

Mifflin Harcourt, 2020). Although the visual images I am including are all from the United States, such hostile architecture is not limited to the United States or Western hemisphere. For example, see a recent discussion of Japanese examples in Philip Brasor's "How Hostile Design Keeps Japan's Homeless at Arm's Length," *The Japan Times*, December 12, 2020. https://www.japantimes.co.jp/news/2020/12/12/national/media-national/homeless-bench-designs/ accessed December 13, 2020.

63 Rosenberger, *Callous Objects*, 53.

64 Katsuoki Horikawa and Tomoaki Hosaka, "Mother: Bus Driver 'Refused' to Let Me Board with Twin Buggy," *The Asahi Shinbun*, November 12, 2019.

65 Rosenberger, *Callous Objects*, 58.

66 Shen-yi Liao and Bryce Huebner, "Oppressive Things," *Philosophy and Phenomenological Research* 103 (2021): 94. I thank Anne Eaton for calling attention to this article.

67 Ibid., 98.

68 I thank one of the participants in the colloquium at the University of Illinois in Chicago who raised this point.

69 There are interventions by artists that subvert the exclusionary intent of those objects. See Rosenberger, *Callous Objects*, 60–4. More examples of hostile architecture and some artistic interventions can also be seen in "Unpleasant Design & Hostile Urban Architecture" (July 5, 2016) at https://99percentinvisible.org/episode/unpleasant-design-hostile-urban-architecture/, accessed October 14, 2021. Another example of artistic intervention is Sarah Tooley's installation project in the Washington D.C. involving the area residents, "Public Dialogues in Public Places," which installed brightly colored park benches with the residents' statements about what they use the benches for, as a protest against the removal of benches by the city to prevent homeless people from sleeping on them. The interesting twists and turns created by this project is narrated in "Community Response to Defensive Architecture" posted by Hidden Hostility DC (no date) at https://www.hiddenhostilitydc.com/responses, accessed October 14, 2021.

70 Busch, *The Uncommon Life*, 87, emphasis added.

71 Joan Iverson Nassauer, "Care and Stewardship: From Home to Planet," *Landscape and Urban Planning* 100 (2011): 322.

72 See Nassauer's "Messy Ecosystems, Orderly Frames," *Landscape Journal* 14, no. 2 (1995): 161–70 and "Cultural Sustainability: Aligning Aesthetics and Ecology," in *Placing Nature: Culture and*

Landscape Ecology, ed. Joan Iverson Nassauer (Washington: Island Press, 1997): 65–83.

73 Nassauer, "Care and Stewardship," 321.

74 Ibid., 322.

75 Ibid., 323.

76 Thompson, "Towards an Aesthetics of Care," 38.

77 James Thompson, "Performing the 'Aesthetics of Care,'" in *Performing Care: New Perspectives on Socially Engaged Performance*, ed. Amanda Stuart Fisher and James Thompson (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2020), 218, 219.

78 Ibid.